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Abstract
Memories of our personal past are the building blocks of our narrative identity. So, 
when we depend on objects and other people to remember and construct our per-
sonal past, our narrative identity is distributed across our embodied brains and an 
ecology of environmental resources. This paper uses a cognitive niche construction 
approach to conceptualise how we engineer our memory ecology and construct our 
distributed narrative identities. It does so by identifying three types of niche con-
struction processes that govern how we interact with our memory ecology, namely 
creating, editing, and using resources in our memory ecology. It also conceptualises 
how identity-relevant information in objects and (family) stories is transmitted ver-
tically, i.e., across generations of people. Identifying these processes allows us to 
better understand the cultural information trajectories that constitute our memory 
ecologies. In short, what I’ll argue is that our memory ecology scaffolds our narra-
tive identity and that engineering our memory ecology is a form of narrative niche 
construction.
Keywords Narrative identity · Distributed self · Extended self · Cognitive niche 
construction · Cognitive ecology · Distributed cognition · Transactive memory · 
Extended mind
Introduction
We often remember our personal past through interacting with objects (e.g., pho-
tos, journals, mementos, lifelogs) and reminiscing with other people (e.g., spouses, 
friends, colleagues). Such objects and people involved in autobiographical remem-
bering constitute our memory ecology. Human autobiographical memory is open to 
incorporate and rely on resources in our memory ecology, in that way our mem-
ory systems are distributed across embodied brains and environmental resources 
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(Wegner 1986; Hutchins 1995a; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Michaelian and Sutton 
2013). This has important consequences for our narrative identity because autobio-
graphical memories are the building blocks of our narrative. An influential view on 
personal identity is the narrative self-constitution developed by Schechtman (1996, 
2005). This view suggests that our identity and self are constituted by our autobio-
graphical narrative. What makes you the particular person you are and what distin-
guishes you from other persons is your unique autobiographical narrative. So, in an 
important sense, we are our narrative, which can be defined as a subjective, affec-
tive, and personal story containing a mostly accurate chronological depiction of a 
series of connected events and experiences that constitute our identity. The upshot 
of integrating the distributed memory thesis and the narrative self-constitution view 
is this: If the memories realising our narrative identity are distributed across our 
brains, bodies, and memory ecology, then our narrative identity is distributed, too 
(Heersmink 2017, 2018, 2020).
We don’t yet fully understand the various processes constituting how we inter-
act with and construct our memory ecology. Most research, including my own, has 
looked at the informational properties of objects (Donald 1991; Hutchins 1999; 
Heersmink 2013, 2016) but has not paid much attention to interactional processes 
(but see, e.g., Bietti and Sutton 2015; Steffensen 2017; Fasoli 2018). This paper 
therefore aims to conceptualise how we interact with and engineer our memory 
ecology by using a niche construction approach. Niche construction theory is an 
approach in evolutionary biology, focussing on how organisms change and utilise 
the environment as to improve their fitness landscapes (Laland et al. 2000; Odling-
Smee et al. 2003). Changing the environment allows niche constructing organisms to 
influence selection pressures on certain biological, behavioral, and cognitive traits. 
This theory departs from traditional evolutionary theory, in that it suggests there are 
two main inheritance mechanisms, one genetic and the other ecological. Ecologi-
cal inheritance includes the transfer of knowledge, skills, artifacts, and institutions 
(Jablonka and Lamb 2005). Cognitive niche construction looks specifically at how 
humans create cognition-aiding tools (e.g., an abacus or computer) and represen-
tational systems (e.g., language or number systems) to realise their cognitive goals 
(Sterelny 2003, 2010; Clark 2006). It also looks at how these tools and representa-
tional systems are transmitted across generations.
In this paper, I will analyse how we interact with and construct our memory ecol-
ogy by using the lens of cognitive niche construction theory to look at empirical 
research in cognitive science and human-technology interaction. I shall conceptu-
alise how identity-relevant information in our memory ecology is actively created, 
edited, and used. I also conceptualise how identity-relevant information in objects 
and (family) stories is transmitted vertically, i.e., across different generations of 
people, which can be seen as a form of downstream narrative niche construction. 
Most theorizing on cognitive niche construction is about how humans solve practi-
cal problems, ignoring autobiographical remembering (Sterelny 2003, 2004, 2010, 
2014; Clark 2006; Stotz 2010; Kendall 2011; Sinha 2015; Bertolotti and Magnani 
2017; Heras-Escribano 2020). One goal of this paper is to draw attention to and 
further develop the relation between autobiographical remembering and niche con-
struction theory.
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This paper has the following structure. In the next section, I start by introducing 
the notion of a memory ecology and argue that autobiographical memory systems 
are sometimes distributed across embodied agents and their memory ecology. In 
“Distributed narrative identities” section, I draw out the implications of this claim 
for our narrative identity, suggesting that narrative identity is a relational and dis-
tributed structure. In “Niche construction” section, I outline the niche construction 
approach in evolutionary biology, focusing on cognitive niche construction. Having 
thus set the stage, I’ll apply a cognitive niche construction approach to analyse how 
we interact with and engineer our memory ecologies and maintain our distributed 
narrative identities in “Narrative niche construction” section.
Memory ecologies
Evocative objects
Turkle (2007) introduces the notion of an “evocative object”, which she character-
ises as objects that generate a feeling or thought (or both) in their user. Turkle’s 
(2007) edited book contains various examples of singular objects such as a car, suit-
case, cello, radio, painting, analogue camera, raincoat, glucometer, and many more 
personal objects. These objects are evocative because they make their users feel and 
think a certain way, typically associated with their personal past. Their evocative 
powers sometimes aren’t the primary or intended function of the object but more 
an accidental by-product of using these objects in daily life. For example, a car is 
primarily designed and used for driving but may also remind its user of a previous 
roadtrip, a suitcase is primarily designed and used for carrying materials but may 
also remind its user of a previous citytrip, etc.
I want to stretch Turkle’s concept of evocative objects here to go beyond singular, 
material, tangible structures. Instead, I want the concept to be more liberal, includ-
ing any product of human agency with evocative powers such as smells, music, 
moving images, stories, buildings, and larger built structures. Examples of objects 
evoking personal memories range from perfumes, songs, movies, souvenirs, furni-
ture, works of art, jewellery, books, photo albums, collections of objects, trophies, 
inherited objects, and other types of mementos. Larger built and public structures 
such as monuments, churches, trains, and bridges may also evoke memories. Even 
our embodied presence in places or spaces like restaurants, public squares, streets, 
parks, and airports can evoke personal memories.
In proposing this notion, Turkle draws attention to the emotional and autobio-
graphical dimensions of artifacts, which haven’t received much attention in the phil-
osophical and scientific literature on artifacts. For example, the central works in the 
philosophy and metaphysics of artifacts (e.g., Dipert 1993; Houkes and Vermaas 
2010; Kroes 2012), including major handbooks (Margolis and Laurence 2007; Mei-
jers 2009) and the recently updated entry on “Artifact” in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Preston 2018) don’t discuss emotional and autobiographical charac-
teristics of artifacts. Likewise, central works in  situated, extended, and distributed 
cognition theory (Norman 1993; Hutchins 1995a; Clark 2003, 2008), including the 
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major handbooks (e.g., Robbins and Aydede 2008; Menary 2010b; Newen et  al. 
2018) ignore such dimensions of artifacts. So, emotional and autobiographical char-
acteristics of material culture are a neglected topic in philosophy and cognitive sci-
ence. One goal of this paper is to draw attention to and further conceptualise emo-
tional and autobiographical dimensions of material culture.
We feel connected to evocative objects because they remind us of our past expe-
riences and activities, occasionally also inducing emotional states (Piredda 2020). 
Emotional states are sometimes part of the content of a memory and so when we 
retrieve an emotionally-laden memory of a past event, it can make us feel a cer-
tain way (Pascuzzi and Smorti 2017). In cognitive psychology, memory processing 
is divided in three stages: encoding, storing, and retrieving. Experiences are first 
encoded, then stored in connectionist networks, and later retrieved. Interacting with 
evocative objects primarily activate cognitive processes which construct and retrieve 
the contents of stored memories into consciousness. This is related to the more 
familiar notion of an epistemic action (Kirsh and Maglio 1994). Epistemic actions 
change the input to an agent’s cognitive system and make cognitive processes easier, 
faster, or more reliable. Using cognitive artifacts to perform a cognitive task (e.g. 
deploying a map to navigate) are epistemic actions. Intentionally interacting with 
an evocative object to evoke and construct an autobiographical memory is a type 
of epistemic action, as such actions make it easier to retrieve memories from our 
biological memory system. Because the information stored in connectionist net-
works in the brain fades over time, we need the informational stability provided by 
the environment to reliably remember our personal past (Sutton 2009). When using 
objects to remember our past, we don’t retrieve and construct a complete internal 
memory. Rather, information in the brain and in the object is integrated as to con-
struct a personal memory, suggesting that both the vehicles and processes of remem-
bering our personal past are distributed, in that way constituting a new systemic 
whole (Heersmink 2018). I thus conceptualise human memory systems as extended 
or distributed across embodied brain and environmental resources.1 Extending or 
distributing our autobiographical memories allows us to remember our personal past 
in a way that is quite different from remembering our past without the aid of objects, 
allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner.
Recently, new evocative objects are emerging referred to as lifelogging or self-
tracking systems, which are particularly powerful autobiographical memory tech-
nologies. Lifelogging is the process of capturing one’s past activities and storing 
these in a lifelog. This is done with a variety of technologies, including SenseCams, 
which are small wearable cameras with a wide-angle lens worn around one’s neck. 
These small cameras take a picture every time its internal sensors detect a change 
in environmental conditions such as GPS location and light intensity, so every time 
you’re in a different situation a photo is taken. At the end of the day, you’ll have 
hundreds of photos representing a visual narrative of one’s daily activities. Many 
1 The extended mind thesis received various criticisms, e.g., by Rupert (2004, 2010) and Adams and 
Aizawa (2008). This paper is not the place to defend the extended mind thesis, but for responses to these 
criticisms, see Clark (2008), Menary (2010a) and Rowlands (2010).
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lifelogging technologies are embedded in smartphones and other mobile computing 
devices (e.g., Fitbits and smartwatches), allowing a user to track one’s GPS location, 
sleep patterns, heart rate, dietary intake, purchases, and many other variables. These 
technologies also provide functionalities for archiving emails, text messages, calen-
dar entries, visited webpages, photos, and videos.
Computer scientist and prominent lifelogger Gordon Bell has created a very 
extensive lifelog with annotated photos, videos, audio recordings, webpages, GPS-
based locations, letters, memos, receipts, business cards, meeting agendas, sympo-
sium programs, diplomas, employee evaluations, newspaper clippings, and much 
more. He and his team also developed software allowing him to easily and quickly 
search his lifelog (Bell and Gemmell 2009). Bell and Gemmell claim that lifelogs 
“will become vital to our episodic memory. As you live your life, your personal 
devices will capture whatever you decide to record. Biomemories fade, vanish, 
merge, and mutate with time, but your digital memories are unchanging” (2009, p. 
57). Precisely because lifelogs are more reliable and accurate than biological mem-
ory, they can complement the perceived shortcomings of biological memory such as 
lack of detail, limited storage capacity, and its unreliability, which is for most users 
the main reason for using lifelogging technology. Lifelogging and self-tracking are 
becoming increasingly popular, not just with millennials but across subcultures and 
demographic groups (Lupton 2016). Thus there seems to be a trend where humans 
rely more on technology to aid them in remembering their personal past.
Transactive memory systems
Other people, too, help us remember our personal past. Cognitive psychologist Weg-
ner (1986) develops a theory on how the memory systems of people in close rela-
tionships like marriage, kinship, or friendship are intertwined. In such transactive 
memory systems, there is a cognitive interdependence between group members, in 
which case both agents rely on each other’s memory systems. A transactive memory 
system can be characterised as a cognitive system comprising people in close rela-
tionships in dyads or larger groups who engage collaboratively in encoding, storing, 
and retrieving information. Consider the following example of transactive retrieval 
from the empirical work of Harris et al. (2014) in which a long-married couple tries 
to remember the name of the show they saw on their honeymoon more than 40 years 
ago.
Wife: And we went to two shows, can you remember what they were called?
Husband: We did. One was a musical, or were they both? I don’t… no… one…
Wife: John Hanson was in it.
Husband: Desert Song.
Wife: Desert Song, that’s it, I couldn’t remember what it was called, but yes, I 
knew John Hanson was in it.
Husband: Yes.
In this example, two people give each other personalised cues as to trigger and 
retrieve memories in their transactive memory partner, in that way generating an 
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emergent memory system that knows more than the individual members. Typically, 
the longer people know each other, the deeper their memory systems are integrated, 
and the more efficient the integrated system works. This is so because they have 
more shared experiences and a deeper and broader understanding of the epistemic 
expertise of their transactive memory partner.
How often we rely on information in other people’s memory systems can be seen 
in terms of a spectrum, varying from one-offs (e.g., asking directions to a stran-
ger) to more or less permanent relationships (e.g., with your spouse). Transactive 
memory systems are those more or less permanent systems that are also deeply inte-
grated, interdependent, and typically well-functioning, in that the emerging memory 
system is more than the sum of its parts as the Desert Song example shows. In trans-
active memory systems, encoding processes can be done jointly, for example when 
a couple negotiates who has to remember a joint appointment. Retrieval processes 
are integrated and interdependent through interactive cuing. Sometimes retrieved 
experiences are shared, for example when reminiscing about a past museum visit, 
citytrip, or honeymoon.
Cognitive ecology
The embodied brain is a powerful cognitive system, but there are limits to its capac-
ity to retain detailed information over a long period of time. Consequently, for 
pragmatic reasons, we often rely on information stored in artifacts and other peo-
ple to complete our memory tasks. Human thinking and remembering thus takes 
place in a cognitive ecology (Hutchins 2010), which has been characterised as “the 
multidimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think, sense, communicate, 
imagine, and act, often collaboratively, on the fly, and in rich ongoing interaction 
with our environments” (Tribble and Sutton 2011, p. 94). An underexplored part 
of our cognitive ecologies are environmental resources involved in autobiographical 
remembering, which is the focus in this paper. I refer to the total field of evocative 
objects and transactive memory partners as a memory ecology. Any environmental 
resource (artifactual and social) involved in autobiographical remembering is part of 
our memory ecology and an explanans of autobiographical memory.
Distributed cognition theory suggests that human cognitive systems are distrib-
uted across embodied agents and environmental structures such as artifacts and peo-
ple (Hutchins 1995a; Michaelian and Sutton 2013). On this view, cognitive systems 
aren’t merely realised by structures in the brain but emerge from our interactions 
with environmental resources. The distributed cognition framework “is explicitly 
cognitive in that it is concerned with how information is represented and how rep-
resentations are transformed and propagated in the performance of tasks” (Hutchins 
1995b, p. 265). This view has both methodological and ontological implications. 
The methodological upshot of this view is that to better understand how representa-
tions are transformed and propagated during tasks, the unit of analysis ought to be 
enlarged such that environmental resources are part of the explanans of cognitive 
systems. Better understanding what I will call “information trajectories” is essen-
tial to better understanding the workings of distributed cognitive systems, including 
1 3
Narrative niche construction Page 7 of 23    53 
those related to autobiographical memory. The ontological upshot of this view is 
that cognitive systems are constitutively composed of biological and environmental 
(i.e., technological and social) components (Clark and Chalmers 1998).
Hutchins, still working in a cognitivist framework, perhaps overemphasizes 
the importance of the propagation of representations. In case of distributed auto-
biographical remembering, for example, non-representational evocative objects can 
contribute to constructing a personal memory. For example, in their ethnographic 
work on evocative objects, Petrelli et  al. (2008) observed and interviewed various 
participants about their evocative objects. Reflecting on the autobiographical mean-
ing of her coffee mug, one participant says: “I feel very emotionally attached to it 
for some reason. I bought it in London, when I was working in London. I think it 
is the memory of working in publishing, living in London and going through a sort 
of fulfilling patch in my career” (2008, p. 56). This coffee mug is not an external 
representation in that it doesn’t contain representational information such as pho-
tos, language, or symbols. It nonetheless reminds its owner of certain life periods. 
Many evocative objects are, likewise, non-representational objects obtaining their 
autobiographical function through accidentally associating the object with a mem-
ory (Kirk and Sellen 2010). Finally, I agree with Hutchins that “the study of cogni-
tive ecosystems will become an increasingly important part of cognitive science” 
(2010, p. 705). In this paper, I aim to develop the notion further by homing in on one 
part of our cognitive ecosystem, namely the part that is involved in autobiographical 
remembering.
Distributed narrative identities
Narrative selves
Schechtman (1996, 2005) argues that our identity is constituted by our self-narra-
tive. On this view, what makes you the particular person you are and what distin-
guishes you from other persons is your unique autobiographical narrative. So when 
characterising our identity, we need to focus on our autobiographical memories and 
how they build up a unique narrative of our past experiences and activities. Accord-
ing to Schechtman (1996), in order for a narrative to be identity-constituting, it 
needs to satisfy three criteria or constraints: the narrative needs to be mostly lin-
ear, a person needs to be able to articulate or think through (parts of) the narrative, 
and it has to be largely consistent with reality. Human lives unfold chronologically 
and so the narrative must reflect this in order to be truth-preserving. If we remem-
ber our personal past non-chronologically, it doesn’t reflect actual events and the 
causal relations between them. On the articulation constraint, a person has to be 
able to articulate or think through some version of one’s narrative. When pressed, 
most of us would be able to think through, articulate, or write down a reasonably 
elaborate and detailed autobiography. We know where we lived, studied, worked, 
travelled, who our family, friends and colleagues are, who we’ve dated, etc. On the 
reality constraint, which is related to the linearity constraint, the events constitut-
ing the narrative must be mostly truthful. So, delusions and confabulations can’t be 
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identity-constituting. However, because autobiographical memory is prone to error 
(Schacter 2001) and can be manipulated (Loftus 2003), narratives rarely are per-
fectly accurate depictions of our past.
An essential property of a self-narrative is emplotment. In Paul Ricoeur words 
“emplotment is the operation that draws a configuration out of a simple succes-
sion” (Ricoeur 1984, p. 65). During the process of emplotment, we create mean-
ingful causal connections between the building blocks of the narrative which are 
the autobiographical memories. This happens both on a conscious and subconscious 
level. We sometimes actively create links between memories by thinking through 
and analysing past events. But emplotment also happens below the threshold of con-
sciousness, for example during sleep, when our brain processes experiential infor-
mation, integrating it into our narrative and web of beliefs. Without emplotment, 
there would only be a mere succession of events without an understanding of how 
they are causally related. Emplotment is thus the glue that keeps the building blocks 
of the narrative together. I characterise a self-narrative as a subjective, affective, and 
personal story containing a mostly accurate chronological depiction of a series of 
connected events and experiences that constitute our identity.
Strawson (2004) has written an influential criticism on the notion of narrative 
selfhood. He distinguishes between a descriptive and ethical version of the narrative 
self. The descriptive version claims that, as an empirical fact, people have a narra-
tive sense of their past and lives, whereas the ethical version claims that conceiving 
of one’s life narratively is desirable, contributing to a well-lived life and full person-
hood. Strawson disagrees with both claims. He attacks narrative theorists by say-
ing that their theories are based merely on introspection. When narrative theorists 
introspect, they find a narrative that structures their lives and experiences. They then 
generalise this observation to all persons. When Strawson himself introspects, he 
finds no narrative, providing a counter example to the universalist claims of narra-
tive theorists. My view is that narratives being implicit structures doesn’t undermine 
their role in constituting identity. I don’t constantly have to think through my past 
and narrative for it to be constitutive of my identity (Jongepier 2016). Furthermore, 
there is empirical evidence supporting the narrative self view (e.g., Habermas et al. 
2009). There are also more conceptual defences against Strawson’s criticism (e.g., 
Rudd 2009; Mackenzie and Poltera 2010; Schechtman 2014).2
Relational identities
How do memory ecologies and autobiographical narratives interact? Memory 
ecologies help us to remember our personal past, which is important because the 
way we remember our personal past is constitutive of our narrative identities. The 
2 Additionally, I don’t deny that persons also have a minimal self or a subject of experience (Gallagher 
2000). This is the entity that has experiences and initiates action and so it has subjecthood and agent-
hood. My view is that some of the experiences of the minimal self ultimately become memories that are 
integrated into the narrative constituting our identity. But for more discussion on the relation between the 
minimal and narrative self, see (Menary 2008; Zahavi 2010; Krueger 2011; Heersmink 2020).
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autobiographical memories realising our narrative identity are thus distributed 
across our embodied brains and memory ecologies. Without interacting with our 
memory ecology, we wouldn’t be able to remember our past in the same way. Our 
memory ecology thus provides stability for our narrative identity. The argument I’m 
proposing has the following structure:
(P1). Human selves have a narrative structure realised by autobiographical 
memories.
(P2). Some of our autobiographical memories are distributed across embodied 
brains interacting with their memory ecology.
(P3). If human selves have a narrative structure realised by autobiographical 
memories and if some of our autobiographical memories are distributed, then 
human selves are also distributed.
(C). Therefore, human narrative selves are sometimes distributed structures.
In Turkle’s (2007) edited volume on evocative objects, design theorist William 
Mitchell suggests a similar view when he writes that “objects, narratives, memories 
and space are woven into a complex and expanding web, each fragment of which 
gives meaning to all the others” (Mitchell 2007, p. 150). I think Mitchell is right 
in saying that objects, narratives, memories, and space are integrated into a larger 
entity. On my view, this larger entity is our distributed narrative self. But we differ 
in that I think the narrative is the organising principle of the way objects, memories, 
and space are interwoven. Individual memories are sometimes retrieved and con-
structed through interacting with resources in our memory ecology, and the overall 
narrative helps us to make (historical) sense of the individual memories that build 
up the narrative, allowing us to see our life as an unfolding trajectoy.
Before moving on to outlining cognitive niche construction theory, two brief 
points of clarification on the notion of a distributed narrative identity will be helpful. 
First, one may argue that distributed narrative identities are not necessary proper-
ties of selves. It is possible to have a narrative without it being distributed, at least 
for certain periods of time. A person can dispose of evocative objects, cut ties with 
transactive memory partners, and spend (parts of) one’s life in isolation. Prisoners in 
solitary confinement, for example, lack access to their memory ecology and during 
those periods may not have a distributed narrative identity, yet they still have a nar-
rative identity. Such cases are uncommon, to be sure, but nonetheless show that hav-
ing a distributed narrative identity is not an essential property of selfhood. However, 
given our highly technological and social lifeworld, most people’s memory systems 
are entangled with evocative objects and transactive memory partners, in that way 
sustaining their distributed narrative identity. So, distributed narrative identities are 
contingent properties of selves, depending on our particular sociotechnical situation.
Second, my claim is not that consciousness is extended or distributed. Some phi-
losophers identify self with conscious experience, conceptualising the self as the 
subject of experience (e.g., Strawson 2017). I’m not claiming that the subject of 
experience is extended or distributed across agent and environment. My claim is that 
the building blocks of self-narratives have internal (i.e., neurological and biological) 
and external (i.e., technological and social) components, suggesting that narratives 
are distributed. However, the subject of experience, whatever it exactly is, is realised 
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by an embodied brain alone. In this sense, my view is perhaps less radical than it 
may first appear.
Niche construction
Having outlined how our memory ecology distributes our narrative identity, I now 
continue with outlining the conceptual framework I will use for better understanding 
how we interact with and construct our memory ecology.
Niche construction theory is a relatively new approach in evolutionary biology, 
emphasising the importance of cultural activities for evolutionary processes. “Niche 
construction refers to the activities, choices, and metabolic processes of organisms, 
through which they define, choose, modify, and partly create their own niches” 
(Laland et al. 2000, pp. 132–133). Some organisms have evolved niche construction 
behaviours, allowing them to alter their local environment which improves their fit-
ness landscapes. Spiders, for example, create webs, beavers build dams, birds make 
nests, moles dig burrows, and termites build mounds. This kind of tool-use allows 
animals to actively alter their niche, creating a safer, more regulated environment, 
which is beneficial for their chances of survival and reproduction, thereby providing 
an evolutionary benefit.
Once these external structures are built, they can become the source of selection 
for regulatory, maintenance, and defence behaviours. Some ant and termite species, 
for instance, regulate the temperature in their mounds through closing the entrances 
at night to keep the cold air out or change the shape and size of their mound such 
that it absorbs more sunlight. Such behaviours evolved in response to selection pres-
sures that were initiated by the building of the mounds. Notably, offspring of niche 
constructing organisms sometimes inherit the environment built by their parents, 
indicating that niche construction has downstream consequences. In such cases, they 
don’t just inherit genes from their parents but also a modified environment, changing 
their selection pressures. There are thus two kinds of inheritance: genetic and eco-
logical. Ecological inheritance is important because it allows organisms to modify 
natural selection pressures, influencing their evolutionary trajectory (Odling-Smee 
1988).
Cognitive niche construction
Humans, too, alter their niches. We are, in fact, niche constructers par excellence, 
outperforming all other niche constructing species. We build houses, agricultural 
systems, transportation systems, energy systems, healthcare systems, and many 
other systems that physically alter our local and non-local environment. A particu-
larly interesting kind of human niche construction is cognitive and epistemic in 
nature. We don’t just alter our physical environment, but also our informational envi-
ronment (Sterelny 2003, 2004, 2010; Clark 2006; Stotz 2010; Kendall 2011; Sinha 
2015; Bertolotti and Magnani 2017). We developed number systems, cartographic 
systems, diagrams, symbols, alphabets, and languages as well as technologies to 
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store that information such as clay tablets, papyrus scrolls, books, newspapers, aba-
cuses, computers, and the internet. An embodied brain embedded in an ecology of 
informational artifacts is able to achieve and remember vastly more than an embod-
ied brain alone. Such external information-storage systems typically have properties 
that complement those of the embodied brain (Sutton 2010). External information is 
usually fixed, discreet, and often more durable, whereas information retained in con-
nectionist networks in the brain is more prone to changing over time (Sutton 2009). 
Because external information has different properties than information stored in bio-
logical memory, we can exploit these differences as to overcome the shortcomings 
of biological memory, thereby (often) enhancing it.
There is another way in which humans obtain information, namely through social 
learning. We often learn information and skills from others in our community. Such 
learned information and skills are important, in part because they can guide niche 
construction behaviours such as building infrastructure, agriculture, or healthcare 
systems. There are various social mechanisms or trajectories for transmitting infor-
mation and skills: (1) vertical (i.e., from parents to offspring), (2) oblique (i.e., from 
the parental generation but not the parents, e.g., from teachers to students), and (3) 
horizontal (i.e., within a generation, e.g., from peer to peer) (Laland et  al. 2000). 
Social learning ensures we don’t have to invent the same skill, procedure, or technol-
ogy twice. For example, once the skills, techniques, and tools of agriculture were 
invented, they spread through social learning, vertically, obliquely, and horizontally.
Downstream epistemic engineering
Interestingly, as Sterelny (2003) argues, we do not just engineer our current cogni-
tive niche, we also engineer the cognitive niche of the next generation. A distinc-
tion can be made between one’s personal and public cognitive niche (Sterelny 2010). 
I engineer my personal cognitive niche, for example with post-it notes, calendars, 
to-do lists, and notebooks. These cognitive artifacts contain information I created 
for my own goals. I also often use public informational resources engineered by 
other people, for example traffic signs, thesauruses, textbooks, and Wikipedia. But 
in both cases, the informational medium I use to scaffold my memory and cogni-
tion is developed by parent generations. Language, numbers, maps, and other sym-
bol systems were developed long ago and passed on to new generations. We were 
born into the informational environment our parent generation has made, our parent 
generation was born into the informational environment their parent generation has 
made, etc. Evolutionary biologists Jablonka and Lamb (2005) refer to the transfer 
of symbolic information such as language, numbers, and maps from one generation 
to the next as a “symbolic inheritance system”. Importantly, we often improve the 
informational environment in which we are born, which Sterelny (2003) refers to 
as “cumulative downstream epistemic engineering”. The importance of symbolic 
inheritance for human culture and cognition can hardly be understated. Merlin Don-
ald, for example, argues that “The memory repositories of culture allow our spe-
cies to transmit across generations the codes, habits, institutional structures, and 
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symbolic memory systems that are needed to operate a significant portion of the 
processes of modern cognition in human culture” (2000, p. 20).
To give a specific example of cumulative downstream epistemic engineering from 
distributed cognition theory, consider the classic example of a team of navy sailors 
trying to navigate a frigate into harbour by using a variety of artifacts such as an ali-
dade, a compass, a log, and a map (Hutchins 1995a). Navigators on each side of the 
ship take measurements of a distant object with an alidade, which are first written in 
a log, and then later communicated to the plotter and bearing recorder who jointly 
triangulate the readings on a map to determine the location of the ship. New sailors 
learning the navigational process inherit both the practices and cognitive tools from 
previous generations. Alidades, compasses, logs (including number systems and lan-
guage), and maps have quite a long developmental history. Alidades were invented 
in the  16th century, compasses were invented in 200 BC in China, the Hindu-Arabic 
number system goes back to the  1st century, the Western alphabet was developed in 
750 BC in Greece, and the history of cartography goes back at least to 2500 BC and 
was developed in the ancient Near East. Such navigational instruments and symbol 
systems have long cultural-evolutionary trajectories. Current navigators therefore 
stand in a long tradition of instruments, external symbol systems and the cultural 
practices associated with their use. Navigators don’t have to invent the same cogni-
tive technology twice and don’t have to figure out how to use the technology because 
they acquire these skills from their colleagues through (oblique) social learning.
A distinction between cognitive artifact and the representational systems it stores 
is helpful (Heersmink 2016). A cognitive artifact is a material object or structure 
that contains and sometimes computes information. Examples include alidades, 
compasses, rulers, scales, abacuses, notebooks, and digital computers. Represen-
tational systems are media for representing information. Charles Saunders Peirce’s 
(1931) tripart distinction between icons, indices, and symbols is useful here to better 
understand the properties of representational systems. Icons such as maps and scale 
models are structurally similar to their target domain. A scale model of an airplane 
is structurally and visually similar to the actual airplane it represents. Indices such 
as alidades, compasses, and thermometers have a direct causal connection to their 
target domain. If the target systems changes, the index changes, too. If the tempera-
ture increases, the reading on the thermometer changes, too. Symbols such as num-
bers, words, and sentences primarily obtain their meaning through social conven-
tions, agreement, and shared use. We often improve both the cognitive artifacts and 
representational systems our parent generation has made. The cultural evolution of 
representational systems and the artifacts that store and manipulate them has been 
one of progress and improvement. Languages keep evolving and current computers 
are much more powerful and efficient than those of the past, roughly doubling their 
processing powers in 18 months. Likewise, current alidades, compasses, and maps 
are more efficient and accurate than those used hundreds of years ago.
Socrates expressed concerns about the effects of written language on individ-
ual memory and he may well be right, in that writing has transformed our bio-
logical memory capacities. Before writing was introduced, information was com-
municated through oral narratives. The introduction of writing has transformed 
our ability to remember and articulate long narratives (Ong 1982). Similar claims 
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can be made about number systems, maps, and other representational systems. 
Because these systems allow us to store information externally, we don’t have 
to store it internally, in that way (through lack of practice) weaken some of our 
memory skills (Sparrow et  al. 2011). However, these representational systems 
allow information to spread horizontally and vertically in a way that spoken lan-
guage cannot. This has generated an enormous amount of intellectual progress 
that has been unprecedented in our evolutionary history. Without the horizon-
tal and vertical transfer of information through cognitive artifacts, representa-
tional systems, and social learning, human culture and cognition would not be 
as advanced and sophisticated as they are now. Much progress in the humanities, 
sciences, law, and government would not be possible without the cultural transfer 
of information.
Laland and Sterelny (2006) point out that niche construction theorists
seek to explain the adaptive complementarity of organism and environ-
ment in terms of a dynamic, reciprocal interaction between the processes of 
natural selection and niche construction. Evolution is based on networks of 
causation and feedback in which organisms drive environmental change and 
organism-modified environments subsequently select organisms (p. 1751).
So, organisms adapt to their environment, but they also adapt the environment, in 
that way changing some of the selection pressures and giving (human) agency a 
much more prominent role in evolutionary theory. By externalising memory, we 
may have influenced the selection pressures on biological memory. The capac-
ity to remember facts and experiences has obvious practical and evolutionary 
benefits. But there is currently no longer a strong evolutionary selection pressure 
to store a lot of detailed information in the brain when you can also store that 
information in the environment. Reliable access to external memory, weakens 
the selection pressure for a good biological memory. However, because reliable 
access to external information for the general population significantly increased 
only with the invention of the printing press (in the 15th century) and became 
substantial with the invention of the internet and mobile computing devices (in 
the 20th and 21st century), evolutionary processes may not have had sufficient 
time to transform the phenotypic trait of biological memory. It is, however, 
unquestionable that cognition and culture (in general) and biological memory and 
environmental memory (in particular) interact in various ways (Donald 1991).
A reviewer pointed out that it’s possible to be committed to the importance 
of niche construction as a process without being committed to the importance of 
ecological inheritance. I support a stronger version of niche construction theory, 
one that argues that both niche construction as a process and ecological inherit-
ance is important for better understanding how human cognitive evolution occurs. 
My view is that downstream epistemic engineering must be taken into account if 
one wants to better understand our cognitive capacities and how those capacities 
have evolved in relation to the epistemic niche. Ecological inheritance of cogni-
tive artifacts and representational systems is thus central to the development and 
evolution of our cognitive capacities.
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Narrative niche construction
Both distributed cognition theory and cognitive niche construction theory focus on 
changing and using the environment to complete practical cognitive tasks, providing 
some benefit for the agent. Resources in our memory ecology supporting autobio-
graphical remembering, by contrast, typically aren’t used for problem-solving activ-
ities. Instead, they are used for thinking about the personal past, which often has 
identity-supporting functions (Wilson and Ross 2003). There are of course excep-
tions, but in most cases, we don’t use an evocative object or reminisce with a trans-
active memory partner to solve a practical problem. Autobiographical memory and 
narrative identity, however, do have practical and evolutionary benefits. Autobio-
graphical narratives provide coherence and structure to our temporal existence. We 
are organisms that exist over a relatively long period of time, accumulating many 
experiences. To make sense of these experiences, we organise them in terms of a 
narrative. Autobiographical narratives help us to make sense of our past, understand 
the present in terms of an unfolding trajectory, and be future-orientated. These prop-
erties of narratives are very important for agents to successfully get around in the 
world. People with autobiographical memory disorders, including dementia, brain 
injury, and amnesia often have a diminished agency (Klein et al. 2004). This dimin-
ished agency can be partly restored by using evocative objects like SenseCams and 
lifelogs (Hodges et al. 2011). For these reasons, it’s important that we maintain our 
memory ecology and narrative identity. This section outlines how we interact with 
and construct our memory ecology by first identifying three types of niche construc-
tion processes and then conceptualises how identity-relevant information in objects 
and (family) stories is transmitted across generations of people.
Cognitive engineering
Before describing how we construct our memory ecology, it is helpful to briefly 
characterise the more general notion of cognitive engineering. I will treat cogni-
tive engineering and cognitive niche construction as synonyms, characterising these 
as altering and utilising the environment for realising our cognitive goals. On this 
characterisation, cognitive engineering has three main components or stages. The 
engineering process starts with generating a mental plan for modifying or building 
an object or structure, typically as a response to a problem situation. Generating a 
mental plan can be seen as the design stage of the engineering process. This plan 
is then executed by intentionally acting on the environment as to make an object or 
structure. The mental plan is typically updated during the making process, allowing 
for some flexibility and improvisation. Finally, the created object or structure is used 
for performing a cognitive function, realising the goal(s) of its user(s).
Sometimes these stages are performed by a single person, but more often they are 
performed by different people or groups of people. When these stages are completed 
by one person, I refer to it as personal cognitive engineering. An example is making 
a shopping list. The process starts by generating a mental plan, including an inten-
tion, for making the list in response to a problem situation. The problem situation, 
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in this case, is an inability to remember a long list of items. The list is then made 
by an agent, and used to aid remembering buying certain things. When engineering 
results in publicly available cognitive resources, I refer to it as public cognitive engi-
neering. An example is using traffic signs to navigate. In this case, an agent uses the 
information on traffic signs to navigate, but designing and creating the traffic signs 
is performed by others. In cases of public cognitive engineering, an agent only has 
to generate an intention and then use a pre-existing cognitive artifact. The designing 
and creating stages are done by others. Cognitive engineering can also be social in 
nature, in which case an agent creates and uses social structures to achieve his or her 
cognitive goals. For example, rather than using traffic signs to navigate from A to B, 
you can ask your friend who is familiar with the area to help you navigate by provid-
ing instructions. In this case, you use information stored in someone else’s memory 
to perform a cognitive task.
Creating, editing, using
Having this general characterisation of cognitive engineering in place, let us move 
on to narrative engineering, which I characterise as intentionally altering and utilis-
ing the environment for aiding us in remembering our personal past. In this section, 
I identity three types of processes that govern how we interact with our memory 
ecology, namely creating, editing, and using resources in our memory ecology.
Creating a resource in our memory ecology can be done in a variety of ways. We 
may intentionally create an evocative object, for example by taking a photo or video, 
buying a souvenir, or writing an entry in one’s journal. We create these objects with 
the intention to use them later for retrieving and constructing memories. However, 
associations between an object and a memory are sometimes formed unintentionally. 
For example, the chair in which I sat when the Netherlands won the European cup 
may bring back memories of the match, going back to the Piazza Navona may evoke 
memories of a previous trip to Rome, or a song may evoke memories of your teen-
age years. In such cases, material culture evokes memories without the object being 
created for that purpose. These accidental associations between objects and memo-
ries are therefore not a form of narrative engineering, because (as outlined in the 
previous section) engineering requires intentional agency. However, once the asso-
ciation is made, the object can intentionally be used to evoke memories, in which 
case it is a form of narrative engineering. A musician may, for example, have formed 
an accidental association between her cello and a show she performed at the Sydney 
Opera House and because of this association place the instrument in her living room 
to evoke memories of the show.
With transactive memory systems, it is possible to intentionally create a mem-
ory in one’s transactive memory partner, for example when asking one’s partner to 
remind one to pay the rent. It is also possible for a dyad to intentionally perform 
some activity (e.g., museum visit, honeymoon, etc.) with the purpose of creating 
shared memories. It is, however, more typical for transactive memory systems to 
work more spontaneously, in that shared memories aren’t created intentionally 
but are the by-product of shared activities. In most cases, one’s agency doesn’t 
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intentionally create memories in a transactive memory partner in the same way as it 
does in evocative objects.
Editing is intentionally changing the pre-existing informational composition of 
one’s memory ecology. We may do so by removing an evocative object, deleting 
a photo or video, or putting an evocative object in a box in the garage because we 
no longer want to be reminded of the memory the object triggers. Lifelogs, too, are 
frequently edited. Lifelogging technology creates information that is not always use-
ful. SenseCams, for example, create many photos that are irrelevant and need to be 
deleted as to avoid an information overload. More radical forms of editing are mov-
ing to a new house after a loved one passed away as to not be reminded of that per-
son. One may also avoid certain places like restaurants, public squares, etc., as to not 
be reminded of some person or event. Traumatised people, for example, often avoid 
the place where the trauma occurred as to not be reminded of the event that caused 
the trauma. Conversely, one may also undelete photos or videos, put an evocative 
object from a box in the garage in one’s living room, or move to a certain place as 
to be reminded of past events or life periods. Whilst less common, editing can also 
occur in transactive memory systems. For example, when reminiscing with one’s 
partner it may become clear that the way your partner understands a shared event 
is different from how you understand it. Consider the following empirical example 
from Harris et  al. (2014) where a husband and wife reminiscence about a shared 
experience during a trip they took.
Husband: I remember pulling into that little area and I recall him being a little 
concerned because it was private property, remember? The big sign that said…
Wife: Do no enter!?
Husband: Do no enter. Prosecution may occur.
Wife: And yes. And then he was in his very well marked moose safari couch 
that would have been very easy to locate again should they wish to have taken 
action.
Husband: And remember the police car went past and he wouldn’t go in until 
the police car had disappeared.
Wife: Oh is that, oh ok. I didn’t quite understand the significance of that, but 
now…right. Yeah I didn’t remember, I didn’t understand that at the time.
In this example, the content of a memory of one’s transactive memory partner is 
updated in the light of new information. Whilst this may not necessarily be an inten-
tional process, in that the husband didn’t start reminiscing with the goal to edit and 
update a memory stored in his partner’s brain and is therefore not a form of social 
cognitive engineering, it is a process where the contents of one’s memory ecology 
are changed.
Using is intentionally interacting with an evocative object or transactive memory 
partner for the purpose of retrieving and constructing an autobiographical memory. 
Examples of using are browsing through one’s photos on one’s smartphone, com-
puter, or analogue photo album, visiting a place, playing a song, wearing a piece of 
jewellery or clothing, or interacting with one’s lifelog with the intention to evoke 
a personal memory. Sometimes autobiographical memories are unintentionally 
retrieved when interacting with an object or person, for example when watching a 
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tv show that reminds you of your recent trip to Italy. Whilst such unintentionally 
retrieved memories are common, they wouldn’t classify as using, because using 
requires goal-directed intentional agency. Initiating a conversation with one’s trans-
active memory partner with the purpose of reminiscing about the (shared) past can 
also be seen as a form of using. Quite often, however, conversations with transactive 
memory partners happen spontaneously. When using resources in our memory ecol-
ogy, non-occurrent memories are retrieved and reconstructed, thereby reminding us 
of our personal past and maintaining our narrative identity.
The way we remember our personal past by using resources in our memory ecol-
ogy has varying levels of specificity. In their seminal paper on memory and self, 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) distinguish between three ways of remembering 
our personal past, which depend on the degree of specificity. We can, first, remem-
ber lifetime periods such as when you went to high school or when you lived in Syd-
ney. Second, we can remember general events, which may be repeated events such 
as going to your favourite restaurant on Fridays or single events like your recent trip 
to Italy for a conference. Third, we can remember specific experiences like your first 
day at school, moving to a new city, or giving a presentation at a conference. Auto-
biographical memories thus have different levels of abstraction. Moreover, memo-
ries of past experiences can be both semantic and experiential. I may, for example, 
merely remember that I did a subject in molecular biology twenty years ago but 
don’t have any specific experiential memories of the lectures and exams. However, 
memories can also be imbued with meaning, affect, and have a rich phenomenol-
ogy, for example the memory of your PhD graduation in which you remember parts 
of the dean’s speech, how you felt, what the room looked like, who was there with 
you, what you did afterwards, etc. Our personal past can thus be remembered both 
semantically and experientially. Interacting with resources in one’s memory ecology 
can trigger semantic and experiential memories, and might be of short or long life-
time periods, of general or specific events, or of specific experiences.
In their empirical work on evocative objects, Kirk and Sellen (2010) examined 
what types of objects trigger autobiographical memories. They conducted an eth-
nography of evocative objects in which they went to people’s homes and observed 
and interviewed the inhabitants who had to select a number of evocative objects 
from each room and explain why and how they were autobiographically meaning-
ful. They distinguish between three types of object storage, which they refer to as 
display, functional storage, and deep storage. When objects are on display, they are 
located in easily visible places, usually in the living room. Due to their location, 
people will perceive the object frequently, thus also frequently triggering memories. 
The main function of objects on display is not practical but to trigger memories. 
When objects are in functional storage, they are typically located in less prominent 
places and will trigger memories only when the object is used. An example Kirk 
and Sellen mention is an inherited ladle located in a kitchen drawer. The participant 
points out that only when the ladle is used it occasionally triggers memories of her 
deceased grandmother. The main function of objects in functional storage is often 
not to trigger memories but is more practical. The evocative powers of such objects 
are secondary to their practical functions. Objects in deep storage are rarely inter-
acted with and often put in boxes in the attic or garage. There are various reasons 
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for putting objects in deep storage, for example for aesthetics reasons, protecting the 
object, reducing clutter, or because it’s associated with a painful or private memory. 
The main function of objects in deep storage is often to trigger memories, they are 
not used for practical functions. This trichotomy of types of object storage shows 
that evocative objects are used in different ways and for different reasons.
This section has demonstrated that our memory ecologies are dynamic, reflecting 
our changing narrative identity. Our narrative identity changes over time in at least 
two ways. First, we have new experiences that we weave into our existing narrative. 
Memories of these new experiences are supported by adding new evocative objects 
(e.g., photos, videos, souvenirs, books, etc.) to our memory ecology and sometimes 
putting these on display. Second, the way we look at events in our personal past 
changes over time, in that some events become less self-defining over time. For 
example, after going on a long-planned safari to Africa, memories of the trip may 
become an important part of one’s narrative identity. Due to the importance of the 
event, someone may put pictures or mementos of the trip on display in one’s living 
room. But after time passes and the event is deeper in one’s past, one may come 
to see the trip as less self-defining and then put the photos and mementos in deep 
storage. Our changing narrative identity is thus supported by a dynamic memory 
ecology.
Downstream narrative niche construction
The examples discussed in the previous section are mainly concerned with narrative 
niche construction in the here-and-now, i.e., with horizontal information trajectories 
between agents and objects or agents and agents. But narrative niche construction 
also happens on longer timescales and can have downstream effects. Downstream 
narrative niche construction occurs when evocative objects and (family) stories are 
passed on from one generation to the next. We often inherit meaningful objects from 
our parents who sometimes have inherited those objects from their parents. One 
example Petrelli and Whittaker (2010) mention is a box (kept in deep storage) given 
to a subject by her mother filled with personal objects. The subject says:
This was given to me by my mother, last Christmas. She picked up all sorts 
of lovely little family treasures: pictures of my great grandparents, my great 
grandmother’s sewing things, my great uncles wooden carvings and all sorts of 
old family things. It’s like a little corner of part of my life (2010, p. 161).
Likewise, we also “inherit” stories from our parents, grandparents, and other family 
members (McAdams 2004). Social psychologists Michael Pratt and Barbara Fiese 
point out that “Family stories are one way in which individuals connect across gen-
erations and create a sense of family history and identity” (2004, pp. 2–3). Some-
times these stories are about our own past. We often don’t remember our experi-
ences before age 4 and have very few memories of the period between age 4 and 
10, which is referred to as childhood amnesia. We learn about this period from our 
parents who narrate our past events to us. Consider the following dialogue between 
John who is an 8-year-old boy and his mother from Fivush et al. (2011).
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John: Um I was born in the Holy Cross Hospital in Weinheim hmmm, what 
happened then Mum?
Mother: (Laughs) Yeah then you were born [John: Yeah] Then we went home 
[John: Yeah and then] That was the first two years, you don’t know [John: 
Yeah] Then we were we were still living at Gran’s the first three months [John: 
Yeah] And as our flat wasn’t ready yet you can’t remember that [John: Yeah]. 
Then we moved with you to the flat in B [John: Hmm] Dad, you, and me 
[John: Hmm] And then we lived there for a while [John Yeah]
John: And then you split up
Mother: Right
John: And then Mum? What happened then?
Mother: Perhaps we should tell a little bit about what it was like while you we 
were living together that you can’t really remember
John: Yeah what was it like then?
Mother: I got my training, I got it quite early, we were pretty young.
In this example, John’s mother narrates events from his past to him such that he 
can incorporate those into his narrative. Such mother–child dyads can be seen as 
an intergenerational transactive memory system, in which the mother functions as 
the autobiographical memory system for the child, thereby scaffolding the content 
of the child’s narrative. Importantly, parents do not just scaffold the content of the 
narrative, but also scaffold the narrative skills of their children. As soon as children 
can talk, parents encourage them to narrate their past by asking and elaborating on 
their past activities (Reese 2002). Parents continue to scaffold the development of 
their children’s narrative capacities throughout childhood and adolescence. In par-
ent–child dyads, there are thus social mechanisms for the vertical transmission of 
both narrative content and narrative skills, which can be seen as a form of down-
stream narrative niche construction. More generally, family stories can provide 
material for the formulation of personal and narrative identity. Grandchildren may, 
for example, with pride and a sense of family connection, have incorporated stories 
of their grandparents’ ambitious and successful migration to their new home country 
(Pratt and Fiese 2004).
Kirk and Sellen (2010) studied how objects are passed on from one generation to 
the next. One participant inherited a book of jam recipes from her deceased grand-
mother, reminding her of her shared experiences with her grandmother. Another 
participant keeps inherited photos of deceased relatives so that her children know 
about these relatives, in that way fostering a connection between family members 
and a shared family history. The participant says: “I’m quite aware of that whole 
thing of, erm, them being aware of their identity and their history and where they’ve 
come from, I think that’s really important for children to know that” (Kirk and Sellen 
2010, p. 21). In these examples, identity-relevant information is passed on from one 
generation to the next, in that way generating vertical information trajectories which 
constitute a part of our memory ecologies, scaffolding our narrative identity.
Downstream narrative niche construction is not necessarily cumulative. Improve-
ments made to cognitive technologies and representational systems (e.g., more accu-
rate compasses, new words, new scientific symbols, new programming languages, 
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updated maps, new ways of representing knowledge, etc.) often first spread hori-
zontally and then also vertically and obliquely throughout a population. Because 
this kind of niche construction is cumulative, the new generation keeps making 
improvements to the inherited cognitive technologies and representational systems. 
For example, computer systems keep improving and natural languages keep evolv-
ing. By contrast, inherited objects and (family) stories are possibly passed on a few 
generations and so the cultural lineage or trajectory of those objects and stories is 
typically much shorter as compared to traditional lineages of cognitive technologies 
and representational systems. Religious texts such as the Vedas, bibles, and Korans, 
for example, have been passed on for hundreds of generations. Downstream narra-
tive niche construction is thus often not cumulative, in the sense that we usually 
don’t make improvements to the content and functions of inherited objects and (fam-
ily) stories, although the meaning of objects and content of stories may, of course, 
change when passed on to the next generation.
Conclusion
This paper has conceptualised how we engineer our memory ecology and manage 
our distributed narrative identities by using a cognitive niche construction approach. 
I first argued that our autobiographical memory systems are distributed, in that we 
often remember our personal past by interacting with evocative objects and transac-
tive memory partners. I then argued our identity is constituted by our narrative and 
that this narrative is constructed by interacting with evocative objects and other peo-
ple. Our narrative identity, or so I claimed, is relational and distributed across our 
brains, bodies, and environmental resources. I ended with identifying three types of 
niche construction processes that govern how we interact with our memory ecology, 
namely creating, editing, and using resources in our memory ecology. I also concep-
tualised how identity-relevant information in objects and (family) stories is trans-
mitted vertically, that is, across generations of people. Identifying these processes 
allows us to better understand the cultural information trajectories that constitute our 
memory ecologies. Thus, what I argued in this paper is that our memory ecology 
distributes our narrative identity and that engineering our memory ecology is a form 
of narrative niche construction.
Acknowledgements I like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
References
Adams F, Aizawa K (2008) The bounds of cognition. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford
Bell G, Gemmell J (2009) Total recall: how the e-memory revolution will change everything. Dutton, 
New York
Bertolotti T, Magnani L (2017) Theoretical considerations on cognitive niche construction. Synthese 
194(12):4757–4779
Bietti L, Sutton J (2015) Interacting to remember at multiple timescales: coordination, collaboration, 
cooperation and culture in joint remembering. Interact Stud 16(3):419–450
1 3
Narrative niche construction Page 21 of 23    53 
Clark A (2003) Natural born cyborgs: minds, technologies, and the future of human intelligence. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford
Clark A (2006) Language, embodiment, and the cognitive niche. Trends Cogn Sci 10(8):370–374
Clark A (2008) Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action and cognitive extension. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford
Clark A, Chalmers D (1998) The extended mind. Analysis 58(1):10–23
Conway M, Pleydell-Pearce C (2000) The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-
memory system. Psychol Rev 107(2):261–288
Dipert R (1993) Artifacts, art works, and agency. Temple University Press, Philadelphia
Donald M (1991) Origins of the modern mind: three stages in the evolution of culture and cognition. 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Donald M (2000) The central role of culture in cognitive evolution: a reflection on the myth of the 
isolated mind. In: Nucci L, Saxe G, Turiel E (eds) Culture, thought and development. Erlbaum, 
Mahwah, pp 39–48
Fasoli M (2018) Substitutive, complementary and constitutive cognitive artifacts: developing an inter-
action-centered approach. Rev Philos Psychol 9:671–687
Fivush R, Habermas T, Waters T, Zaman W (2011) The making of autobiographical memory: inter-
sections of culture, narratives and identity. Int J Psychol 46(5):321–345
Gallagher S (2000) Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends 
Cogn Sci 4(1):14–21
Habermas T, Ehlert-Lerche S, de Silveira C (2009) The development of the temporal macrostruc-
ture of life narratives across adolescence: beginnings, linear narrative form, and endings. J Pers 
77(2):527–560
Harris C, Barnier A, Sutton J, Keil P (2014) Couples as socially distributed cognitive systems: 
remembering in everyday social and material contexts. Mem Stud 7(3):285–297
Heersmink R (2013) A taxonomy of cognitive artifacts: function, information, and categories. Rev 
Philos Psychol 4(3):465–481
Heersmink R (2016) The metaphysics of cognitive artefacts. Philos Explor 19(1):78–93
Heersmink R (2017) Distributed selves: personal identity and extended memory systems. Synthese 
194(8):3135–3151
Heersmink R (2018) The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects. Philos Stud 
175(8):1829–1849
Heersmink R (2020) Varieties of the extended self. Conscious Cogn 85:103001
Heras-Escribano M (2020) The evolutionary role of affordances: ecological psychology, niche con-
struction, and natural selection. Biol Philos 35:30
Hodges S, Berry E, Wood K (2011) SenseCam: a wearable camera that stimulates and rehabilitates 
autobiographical memory. Memory 19(7):685–695
Houkes W, Vermaas P (2010) Technical functions: on the use and design of artefacts. Springer, 
Dordrecht
Hutchins E (1995a) Cognition in the wild. MIT Press, Cambridge
Hutchins E (1995b) How a cockpit remembers its speed. Cogn Sci 19(3):265–288
Hutchins E (1999) Cognitive artifacts. In: Wilson R, Keil F (eds) The MIT encyclopedia of the cogni-
tive sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 126–128
Hutchins E (2010) Cognitive ecology. Top Cogn Sci 2(4):705–715
Jablonka E, Lamb M (2005) Evolution in four dimensions: genetic, epigenetic, behavioral and sym-
bolic variation in the history of life. MIT Press, Cambridge
Jongepier F (2016) Towards a constitutive account of implicit narrativity. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 
15(1):51–66
Kendall J (2011) Cultural niche construction and human learning environments: investigating socio-
cultural perspectives. Biol Theory 6(3):241–250
Kirk D, Sellen A (2010) On human remains: values and practice in the home archiving of cherished 
objects. ACM Trans Comput Hum Interact 17(3):1–43
Kirsh D, Maglio P (1994) On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cogn Sci 18:513–549
Klein S, German T, Cosmides L, Gabriel R (2004) A theory of autobiographical memory: necessary 
components and disorders resulting from their loss. Soc Cogn 22:460–490
Kroes P (2012) Technical artefacts: creations of mind and matter—a philosophy of engineering 
design. Springer, Dordrecht
 R. Heersmink 
1 3
  53  Page 22 of 23
Krueger J (2011) The who and the how of experience. In: Zahavi D, Thompson E, Siderits M (eds) Self, 
no-self? Perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, pp 27–55
Laland K, Sterelny K (2006) Perspective: seven reasons (not) to neglect niche construction. Evolution 
60(9):1751–1763
Laland K, Odling-Smee J, Feldman M (2000) Niche construction, biological evolution, and cultural 
change. Behav Brain Sci 23:131–175
Loftus E (2003) Make-believe memories. Am Psychol 58(11):867–873
Lupton D (2016) The quantified self: A sociology of self-tracking. Polity Press, Cambridge
Mackenzie C, Poltera J (2010) Narrative integration, fragmented selves, and autonomy. Hypathia 
25(1):31–54
Margolis E, Laurence S (eds) (2007) Creations of the mind: theories of artifacts and their representation. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford
McAdams D (2004) Generativity and the narrative ecology of family life. In: Fiese B, Pratt M (eds) Fam-
ily stories and the life course across time and generations. Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp 235–257
Meijers A (ed) (2009) Philosophy of technology and engineering sciences. Elsevier, Amsterdam
Menary R (2008) Embodied narratives. J Conscious Stud 15(6):63–84
Menary R (2010a) Introduction: the extended mind in focus. In: Menary R (ed) The extended mind. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, pp 1–25
Menary R (ed) (2010b) The extended mind. MIT Press, Cambridge
Michaelian K, Sutton J (2013) Distributed cognition and memory research: history and current directions. 
Rev Philos Psychol 4(1):1–24
Mitchell W (2007) The Melbourne train. In: Turkle S (ed) Evocative objects. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 
145–152
Newen A, De Bruin L, Gallagher S (eds) (2018) The Oxford handbook of 4E cognition. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford
Norman D (1993) Things that make us smart: defending human attributes in the age of the machine. 
Addison-Wesley Publishing, Reading
Odling-Smee J (1988) Niche constructing phenotypes. In: Plotkin H (ed) The role of behaviour in evolu-
tion. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 31–79
Odling-Smee J, Laland K, Feldman M (2003) Niche construction: the neglected process in evolution. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton
Ong W (1982) Orality and literacy: the technologizing of the word. Methuen, London
Pascuzzi D, Smorti A (2017) Emotion regulation, autobiographical memories and life narratives. New 
Ideas Psychol 45:28–37
Peirce C (1931) The collected papers, vol 1–6. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Petrelli D, Whittaker S (2010) Family memories in the home: contrasting physical and digital mementos. 
Pers Ubiquit Comput 14(2):153–169
Petrelli D, Whittaker S, Brockmeier J (2008) Autotopography: What can physical mementos tell us about 
digital memories? In: CHI ‘08 ACM conference on Human factors in computing systems, pp 53–62
Piredda G (2020) What is an affective artifact? A further development of situated affectivity. Phenomenol 
Cogn Sci 19(3):549–567
Pratt M, Fiese B (2004) Families, stories, and the life course: an ecological context. In: Fiese B, Pratt M 
(eds) Family stories and the life course across time and generations. Erlbaum, Mahwah, pp 1–24
Preston B (2018) Artifact. In: Zalta E (ed) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. URL: https ://plato .stanf 
ord.edu/entri es/artif act/
Reese E (2002) A model of the origins of autobiographical memory. In: Fagen J, Hayne H (eds) Progress 
in infancy research. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, pp 215–260
Ricoeur P (1984) Time and narrative, vol 1. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Robbins P, Aydede M (eds) (2008) The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge
Rowlands M (2010) The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology. 
MIT Press, Cambridge
Rudd A (2009) In defence of narrative. Eur J Philos 17(1):60–75
Rupert R (2004) Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. J Philos 101(8):389–428
Rupert R (2010) Cognitive systems and the extended mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Schacter D (2001) The seven sins of memory: how the mind forgets and remembers. Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston
1 3
Narrative niche construction Page 23 of 23    53 
Schechtman M (1996) The constitution of selves. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Schechtman M (2005) Personal identity and the past. Philos Psychiatry Psychol 12(1):9–22
Schechtman M (2014) Staying alive: personal identity, practical concerns, and the unity of a life. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford
Sinha C (2015) Language and other artifacts: socio-cultural dynamics of niche construction. Front Psy-
chol 6:1601. https ://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg .2015.01601 
Sparrow B, Liu J, Wegner D (2011) Google effects on memory: cognitive consequences of having infor-
mation at our fingertips. Science 333(6043):776–778
Steffensen S (2017) Human interactivity: problem-finding, problem-solving, and verbal patterns in the 
wild. In: Cowley S, Vallée-Tourangeau F (eds) Cognition beyond the brain. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 
85–103
Sterelny K (2003) Thought in a hostile world: the evolution of human cognition. Blackwell, Oxford
Sterelny K (2004) Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind. In: Schantz R (ed) The exter-
nalist challenge. De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 239–254
Sterelny K (2010) Minds: extended or scaffolded? Phenomenol Cogn Sci 9(4):465–481
Sterelny K (2014) Constructing the cooperative niche. In: Barker G, Desjardins E, Pearce T (eds) Entan-
gled life: history, philosophy and theory of the life sciences. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 261–279
Stotz K (2010) Human nature and cognitive-developmental niche construction. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 
9(4):483–501
Strawson G (2004) Against narrativity. Ratio 17(4):428–452
Strawson G (2017) The subject of experience. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Sutton J (2009) Remembering. In: Robbins P, Aydede M (eds) The Cambridge handbook of situated cog-
nition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 217–235
Sutton J (2010) Exograms and interdisciplinarity: history, the extended mind, and the civilizing process. 
In: Menary R (ed) The extended mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 189–225
Tribble E, Sutton J (2011) Cognitive ecology as a framework for Shakespearean studies. Shakespear Stud 
39:94–103
Turkle S (ed) (2007) Evocative objects: things we think with. MIT Press, Cambridge
Wegner D (1986) Transactive memory: a contemporary analysis of the group mind. In: Mullen B, Goeth-
als G (eds) Theor Group Behav. Springer, New York, pp 185–208
Wilson A, Ross M (2003) The identity function of autobiographical memory: time is on our side. Mem-
ory 11(2):137–149
Zahavi D (2010) Minimal self and narrative self: a distinction in need of refinement. In: Fuchs T, Sattel 
H, Henningsen P (eds) The embodied self: dimensions, coherence, and disorders. Schattauer, Stutt-
gart, pp 3–20
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
